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In an extraordinarily influential paper, Burnside and Dollar (2000, p. 847) find that “… 
aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and 
trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies.” This finding has enormous 
policy implications. The Burnside and Dollar (2000, henceforth BD) result provides a role and 
strategy for foreign aid. If aid stimulates growth only in countries with good policies, this 
suggests that (1) aid can promote economic growth and (2) it is crucial that foreign aid be 
distributed selectively to countries that have adopted sound policies. International aid agencies, 
public policymakers, and the press quickly recognized the importance of the BD findings.
1 
 
This paper reassesses the links between aid, policy, and growth using more data. The BD 
data end in 1993. We reconstruct the BD database from original sources and thus (1) add 
additional countries and observations to the BD dataset because new information has become 
available since they conducted their analyses and (2) extend the data through 1997. Thus, using 
the BD methodology, we reexamine whether aid influences growth in the presence of good 
policies.  
 
Given our focus on retesting BD, we do not summarize the vast pre-BD literature on aid 
and growth. We just note that there was a long and inconclusive literature that was hampered by 
limited data availability, debates about the mechanisms through which aid would affect growth, 
and disagreements over econometric specification (See, Papanek, 1972; Cassen, 1986; Mosley et 
al., 2001; Boone, 1994, 1996; and Hansen and Tarp’s 2000 review). 
   
                                                 
1 See, for instance, the World Bank (1998, 2002a, b), the U.K. Department for International Development (2000), 
President George W. Bush’s speech (March 16, 2002), the announcement by the White House on creating the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (White House 2002), as well as the Economist (March 16, 2002), a Washington 




Since BD found that aid boosts growth in good policy environments, there have been a 
number of other papers reacting to their results, including Collier and Dehn (2001), Collier and 
Dollar (2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Hansen and Tarp 
(2001), and Lensink and White (2001). These papers conduct useful variations and extensions 
(some of which had already figured in the pre-BD literature), such as introducing additional 
control variables, using non-linear specifications, etc. Some of these papers confirm the message 
that aid only works in a good policy environment, while others drive out the aid*policy 
interaction term with other variables. This literature has the usual limitations of how to choose 
the appropriate specification without clear guidance from theory, which often means there are 
more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample.  
 
We differentiate our paper from these others by NOT deviating from the BD 
specification. Thus, we do not test the robustness of the results to an unlimited number of 
variations, but instead maintain the BD methodology. This paper conducts a very simple 
robustness check by adding new data that were unavailable to BD.  Thus, we expand the sample 
used over their time period and extend the data from 1993 to 1997.  
 
II. Robustness checks on the aid-policy-growth relationship 
  
BD’s preferred specification is a growth regression with several control variables 
common to the literature, plus terms for the amount of international aid provided to a country 
(Aid), an index of the quality of the policy environment (Policy), and an aid-policy interaction 
term (Aid*Policy). As control variables, BD include the logarithm of initial Gross Domestic 
Product per capita (Log initial GDP), a measure of ethnic fractionalization (Ethnic), the rate of 
political assassinations (Assassinations), the interaction between ethnic fractionalization and 
political assassinations (Ethnic*Assassinations), regional dummy variables for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and fast-growing East Asian countries (Sub-Saharan Africa and Fast-growing E. Asia 
respectively), an index of institutional quality (Institutional Quality), and a measure of financial 
depth (M2/GDP lagged). The BD policy index, Policy, is constructed from measures of budget 




regression 5 (all developing countries) and 8 (low income countries only) in the BD paper. In 
Table 1, we first show regression 5 from BD using ordinary least squares (OLS). The sample 
here is middle-income and low-income developing countries, and five outliers are omitted. These 
are the five outliers omitted by BD. We reproduce exactly their results in column (1).  
 
Since BD exclude observations that they consider outliers and since we want to follow 
the BD methodology as closely as possible, we adopt the Hadi method for identifying and 
eliminating outliers as we add new data. The Hadi method measures the distance of data points 
from the main body of data and then iteratively reduces the sample to exclude distant data points. 
Critically, when we apply the Hadi method to the BD data, we confirm their results. We will 
continue to use the Hadi procedure in all the regressions in this paper except where we explicitly 
note otherwise. In the spirit of the original BD methodology, we choose a Hadi significance level 
of 0.05 that excludes only a handful of outliers  (between 5 and 11). (See Table 2.) Note, 
however, that keeping the outliers in the regressions does not change this paper’s conclusion. 
  
To test the robustness of the BD results, we undertook an extensive data gathering 
exercise. We collected annual data on all the variables in the BD sample. We went back to the 
original sources and reconstructed the entire database and extended the data through 1997. As 
part of this exercise, we updated the Sachs and Warner openness index. To construct the policy 
index, we follow the BD regression procedure and we always include the budget balance, 
inflation, and Sachs-Warner openness as components of Policy. In addition to extending the 
sample through to 1997, we were able to expand the original BD data. For example, we found 
broader coverage on International Country Risk Guide institutional quality for 1982 by using the 
original source of the data. Considering both the cross-section and the time series expansion, we 
have increased the sample size from their original 275 observations in 56 countries to 356 
observations in 62 countries (before excluding outliers). An appendix describing the 
methodology is presented below.  The data are available at www.cgdev.org. Although our data 
did not match up exactly with theirs (there are inevitably data revisions, where values change, 
new data become available, and some values are reclassified as missing), the correlations are all 




quality, which is 0.90.  Moreover, we were able to reproduce their results with our data when 
we restrict the sample to their time period and their countries as discussed below.  
 
The BD results do not hold when we use new data that includes additional countries and 
extends the coverage through 1997. The aid*policy interaction term enters insignificantly when 
using data from 1970–1997 (Column 2). Not only that, but the coefficient on the aid*policy term 
changes markedly, turning negative, with a t-statistic of –1.09. Figure 1 shows both the partial 
scatter plot of the original BD sample between growth and aid*policy and the partial scatter plot 
using our new, expanded data.  As shown, the positive relationship between growth and 
aid*policy vanishes when using new data. In these analyses, we continue to use the Hadi method 
for eliminating outliers since this method reproduced the original BD results. However, when we 
do not use Hadi and run the results on the full sample, we again find that the aid*policy variable 
enters insignificantly (we will show these results below).  
 
We perform the same exercise with BD regression 8 for the sample of low income 
countries (also following them in omitting outliers). BD note that low income countries might be 
a preferred sample to detect the effects of aid, and indeed their aid-policy interaction term is 
significant in both OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS) in their regression 8. In order to 
check the robustness of the estimates of the instrumental variables estimates, we do the exercise 
in two-stage least squares as shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1. We use the same set of 
instruments as BD. We are again able to reproduce their results with our dataset (see Table 2 
below). 
 
The aid*policy term is insignificant in their regression 8 when we simply add all the data 
for low-income countries that we can collect for 1970–93 and the data for 1994–97 (column 4). 
The coefficient not only becomes insignificant, but changes sign. Our sample is 52 observations 
larger than the BD sample for regression 8. 
 
The fragile results on aid effectiveness remain evident when varying the sample.  For 




for OLS and 2SLS for regressions 5 and 8 for various combinations of sample periods, country 
samples, and when including and excluding outliers.  We reproduce statistical significance when 
restricting our data to the Burnside-Dollar sample period and sample of countries, though the 
coefficient sizes are larger when using the new data.  The significance of the relationship 
between growth and the aid*policy interaction term vanishes, however, if we relax either the 
sample period constraint or the country selection constraint for either regression 5 or 8 (i.e. the 
whole sample and only the low income sample). The significance vanishes for both OLS and 
2SLS in either regression, for using their countries but the whole period sample or for their 
sample period but all countries, and for samples excluding outliers and for samples including 
outliers. Not only does significance vanish, but the magnitude of the coefficient changes greatly 
across the different permutations. 
 
The only significant coefficient out of our various permutations was for OLS for 
regression 8 (the low income sample) using the Burnside-Dollar countries for the full sample 
period. Since this is one significant coefficient at the 5 percent level out of twenty permutations, 
we do not think this provides strong support for the robustness of the Burnside-Dollar results. 
 
We tried all of these same exercises for the other aid*policy regressions that BD report in 
the paper. Burnside and Dollar found the aid*policy term to be significant and positive when 
they did NOT exclude outliers but added another term aid
2*policy (which was significant and 
negative). Their results were significant in OLS for the whole sample and the low income 
sample, but not in 2SLS, so we report only the OLS results. We are able to reproduce their 
results with our dataset using their sample period and sample of countries (Table 3). When we 
try these specifications with our expanded dataset, the previous pattern holds: the aid-policy 
interaction term is not robust to the use of new data, including various permutations of period 
and country selection. In our full sample and in some of the other permutations, the coefficients 
on the aid*policy and aid
2*policy reverse sign from the BD results 
 
Thus, the result of our paper is as follows: adding new data creates new doubts about the 




promotes growth in good policy environments. Similarly, when we expand the BD data by 
using the full set of data available over the original BD period, we no longer find that aid 
promotes growth in good policy environments. Our findings regarding the fragility of the aid-
policy-growth nexus is unaffected by excluding or including outliers.  
 
We also experimented with alternative definitions of “aid” and “good policies”, as well as 
trying different period lengths (from annual data all the way up to the cross-section for the full 
sample). These exercises (available upon request) did not change our conclusion about the 
fragility of the aid*policy term – the aid-policy term is not robust to alternative equally plausible 





This paper reduces the confidence that one can have in the conclusion that aid promotes 
growth in countries with sound policies. The paper does not argue that aid is ineffective. We 
make a much more limited claim. We simply note that adding additional data to the BD study of 
aid effectiveness raises new doubts about the effectiveness of aid and suggests that economists 
and policymakers should be less sanguine about concluding that foreign aid will boost growth in 
countries with good policies. We believe that BD should be a seminal paper that stimulates 
additional work on aid effectiveness, but not yet the final answer on this critical issue. We hope 
that further research will continue to explore pressing macroeconomic and microeconomic 
questions surrounding foreign aid, such as whether aid can foment reforms in policies and 
institutions that in turn foster economic growth, whether some foreign aid delivery mechanisms 






Table 1: Testing the robustness of Burnside and Dollar panel regressions 5 and 8 to 
more data (dependent variable: growth of GDP/capita) 
Regression  1  2 3 4 
Sampling universe: 
All developing countries, 
outliers omitted 
Only low income countries, 
outliers omitted 
Burnside-Dollar 
Regression: Regression  5, OLS  Regression 8, 2SLS 
Right-hand side 
variable: 







BD data, BD 
sample, 
1970–93 
new data set, 
full sample, 
1970–97 
Aid  -0.02  0.20 -0.24 -0.16 
 (0.13)  (0.75)  (-0.89)  (-0.26) 
Aid * policy  0.19**  -0.15  0.25*  -0.202 
 (2.61)  (-1.09)  (1.99)  (-0.65) 
Log initial GDP per 
capita  -0.60 -0.40  -0.83  -1.214* 
 (-1.02)  (-1.06)  (-1.02)  (-2.02) 
Ethnic -0.42  -0.01  -0.67  -0.745 
 (-0.57)  (-0.02)  (-0.76)  (-0.82) 
Assassinations -0.45  -0.37  -0.76  -0.693 
 (-1.68)  (-1.43)  (-1.63)  (-1.68) 
Ethnic * 
Assassinations.  0.79  0.18 0.63 0.69 
 (1.74)  (0.29)  (0.67)  (0.78) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.87*  -1.68**  -2.11**  -1.204 
 (-2.41)  (-3.07)  (-2.77)  (-1.79) 
Fast-growing E. Asia  1.31*  1.18*  1.46  1.009 
 (2.19)  (2.33)  (1.95)  (1.40) 
Institutional quality  0.69**  0.31* 0.85** 0.375* 
 (3.90)  (2.53)  (4.17)  (2.46) 
M2/GDP lagged  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.014 
 (0.84)  (0.16)  (1.39)  (1.00) 
Policy 0.71**  1.22**  0.59  1.613** 
 (3.63)  (5.51)  (1.49)  (2.93) 
Observations  270  345 184 236 
R-squared  0.39  0.33 0.47 0.35 
* indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level and ** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
T-statistics are given in parentheses.  The regressions omit outliers, either as described in Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) or using the Hadi method as discussed in the text.  Variable definitions: Aid is Development 
Assistance/GDP, Policy is a regression-weighted average of macroeconomic policies described in BD, 
Ethnic is ethnic fractionalization from Easterly and Levine 1997, Assassinations is per million population, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Fast-growing E. Asia are dummy variables, Institutional quality is from Knack and 








Table 2: Coefficient on aid*policy in alternative regressions for growth of GDP/capita  
 
  5/OLS 5/2SLS  8/OLS 8/2SLS 
Burnside and Dollar original  0.19** 0.18  0.27** 0.25* 
    (2.61) -1.63  (2.97) (1.99) 
  observations  270 270 184 184 
 
ELR data, BD countries, 1970-93  0.34* 0.56**  0.38* 0.56* 
    (2.41) (2.87) (2.36) (2.28) 
  observations  268 268 178 178 
 
ELR data, full sample, 1970-93  -0.08  0.11  -0.13  0.01 
   (-0.65)  (0.52)  (-0.9)  (0.05) 
  observations  291 291 199 199 
 
ELR data, BD countries, 1970-97  0.30 0.38 0.40*  0.47 
    (1.96) (0.75) (2.38) (1.52) 
  observations  310 310 207 207 
 
ELR data, full sample, 1970-97  -0.15  0.01  -0.20  -0.20 
    (-1.09) (0.05)  (-1.26) (-0.65) 
  observations  345 345 236 236 
 
ELR data, full sample, outliers included, 1970-93  0.05 0.07 0.00 -0.06 
    (0.82) (0.86) (0.03) (-0.52) 
  observations  300 300 205 205 
 
ELR data, full sample, outliers included, 1970-97  0.05 0.06 -0.01  -0.08 
   (0.81)  (0.79)  (-0.06)  (-0.73) 
  observations  356 356 244 244 
 
Note: ELR data refers to dataset constructed for this paper as described in text. All 
regressions omit outliers, either in the original Burnside and Dollar results as described 
in their paper, or in the ELR results using the Hadi method, except where otherwise 
noted. T-statistics are in parentheses.  The number of observations is given below the 
t-statistics.  *indicates significant at 5% level **indicates significant at 1% level.    
Table 3: Testing Burnside-Dollar specification of growth of GDP/capita 
regressions adding aid squared*policy (t-statistics in parentheses, 
observations below t-statistic) 
      4/OLS 7/OLS
0.20* 0.27* aid*policy 
(2.07) (2.03)
-0.02* -0.02* aid^2*policy 
(-2.22) (-2.45)
Burnside and Dollar original 
Observations  275 189
0.31* 0.28 aid*policy 
(2.30) (1.81)
-0.05* -0.05* aid^2*policy 
(-2.35) (-2.41)
ELR data, BD countries, 1970-93 
Observations 274 183
-0.11 -0.27 aid*policy 
(-1.10) (-1.94)
0.02 0.03* aid^2*policy 
(1.92) (2.34)
ELR data, full sample, 1970-93 
Observations  300 205
0.20 0.15 aid*policy 
(1.64) (1.11)
-0.03 -0.03 aid^2*policy 
(-1.58) (-1.56)
ELR data, BD countries, 1970-97 
Observations  322 216
-0.14 -0.27 aid*policy 
(-1.31) (-1.89)
0.03* 0.03* aid^2*policy 
(2.25) (2.35)
ELR data, full sample, 1970-97 
Observations  356 244
Note: ELR data refers to dataset constructed for this paper as described in text. 
*significant at 5% level **significant at 1% level.
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Figure 1: Partial scatter plots of growth against aid*policy 
Top graph: Burnside-Dollar original results 
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Note: These partial scatter plots are from regressions 1 and 3 in Table 1. The partial scatter plot 
involves the two-dimensional representation of the relationship between growth and aid*policy controlling 
for the other regressors.  Thus, we regress growth against the all of the regressors listed in Table 1 except 
aid*policy and collect these growth residuals.  Then, we regress aid*policy against the same regressors and 
collect these aid*policy residuals.  The figures plot the growth residuals against the aid*policy residuals 
along with the regression line. 
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Appendix: Data set construction  
 
(Data posted at www.cgdev.org) 
 
In assembling a new data set for the present study, we imitated as closely as possible the 
process followed by BD, consulting also the authors (although they are of course not 
responsible for any errors we make). We collected all data available from standard cross-
country sources. We also collected new data on black market premium. (See Table A–1.) 
 
The BD and new data sets differ somewhat. Each contains observations for certain 
variables that the other lacks, and the two do not agree perfectly on overlaps. (See Table 
A–2.) BD have some observations that we were not able to reproduce for 1970-93 with 
our more recent data sources, perhaps because data was reclassified as missing in 
subsequent updates. 
 










GDPG  0.962 World Bank 2002c   
Initial GDP per 
capita 
LGDP  1.000 Summers and Heston 
1991, updated using 
GDPG 
Natural logarithm of 
GDP/capita for first year 




ETHNF  1.000 Easterly and Levine 
1997 
Probability that two 
individuals will belong to 
different ethnic groups; 
based on original Soviet 
data 
Assassinations ASSAS  1.000 Banks  2002   
Institutional 
quality 
ICRGE  0.897 PRS Group’s IRIS III 
data set (see Knack 
and Keefer 1995) 
Based on 1982 values, 
the earliest available. BD 
say they use 1980 values. 
Computed as the average 
of five variables 
M2/GDP, lagged 
one period 
M2–1  0.967 World Bank 2002c   
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
SSA  1.000 World Bank 2002c  Codes nations in the 
southern Sahara as sub-
Saharan 
East Asia  EASIA  1.000   Dummy for China, 
Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, 
and Thailand.only 
Budget surplus  BB  0.918 World Bank 2002c; 
IMF 2002 
World Bank primary data 
source. Additional values 
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extrapolated from IMF, 
using series 80 and 99b 
(local-currency budget 
surplus and GDP) 




LBMP  BD do not 










Network database for 
all years expect 1994-
95;  black market 
exchange rate for 




exchange rate from 
IMF 2002 
.Natural logarithm of 1+ 
black market premium 
Sachs-Warner, 
updated 
SACW  0.962 See Table A-4 below  Based on variables 
described in Table A-4. 
Extended to 1998. 





AID  0.953 Chang et al. 1998; 
IMF 2002; DAC 
2002 
Values available from 
Chang et al. for 1975–95. 
Values for 1970–74, 
1996–97, extrapolated 
based on correlation of 
EDA with Net ODA. 
Converted to 1985 
dollars with World 
Import Unit Value index 
from IMF 2002, series 
75. GDP computed like 
LGDP above 




ARMS-1  0.986 U.S. Department of 
State, various years 
Underlying source of 
World Bank 2002, which 
BD use 
1For four-year aggregates, restricted within the 275 complete observations in BD. 
2All 
variables aggregated over time using arithmetic averages. 
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Table A–2. Differences in Sample between Burnside and Dollar and New Data Set 
 
  Burnside and Dollar  New Data Set 
Observations 
unique to set 
Brazil 1970–73, 1974–77 
Algeria 1970–73, 1974–77 
Gambia 1986–89 
Guyana 1970–73, 1974–77, 
1978–81, 1982–85,   
1986–89, 1990–93 
Somalia 1974–77, 1978–81 
Tanzania 1982–85, 1986–89 
Zambia 1970–73, 1974–77, 
1978–81, 1982–85 
Argentina 1982–85, 1986–89, 1990–93 
Botswana 1974–77, 1990–93 
Burkina Faso 1982–85, 1986–89, 1990–93 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1990–93, 1990–93 
Cote d’Ivoire 1982–85, 1986–89, 1990–93 
Ethiopia 1990–93 
Haiti 1990–93 
Iran 1978–81, 1982–85, 1986–89, 1990–93 
Jamaica 1990–93 
Jordan 1974–77, 1978–81, 1982–85, 1986–89, 
1990–93 
Mali 1990–93 
Myanmar 1970–73, 1974–77, 1978–81,     
1982–85, 1986–89, 1990–93 
Papua New Guinea 1978–81, 1982–85,      
1986–89, 1990–93 
Togo 1990–93 
Trinidad and Tobago 1990–93 
Turkey 1970–73, 1974–77, 1978–81, 1982–85, 
1986–89 




None  Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
Philippines, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
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Table A-3: Outliers Excluded from Regressions 
 
Regressions Outliers 
BD data, BD sample, 1970–93  Gambia 1986-89, 1990-93 
Guyana 1990-1993 
Nicaragua 1986-89, 1990-93 
new data set, BD country sample, 1970–93  Gabon 1974-77 
Gambia 1990-93,  
Mali 1990-93 
Nicaragua 1986-89, 1990-93 
Zambia 1990-93 




Jordan 1974-77, 1978-81 
Nicaragua 1986-89, 1990-93 
Zambia 1990-93, 1994-97 
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Updating the Sachs-Warner openness variable 
The set of Sachs-Warner values from Harvard’s Center for International Development 
stops in 1992. In order to extend the study period, we updated the Sachs-Warner (1995) 
openness variable for 1993–98 for those countries with otherwise complete observations 
for 1994–97, and for some other countries. The process of updating also led us to revise 
pre-1993 values for ten countries. 
 
The Sachs-Warner variable is based principally on five components. When a country is 
rated “closed” on any one of the components, it is rated closed overall. Sachs and Warner 
also drew on other sources on an ad hoc basis. Table A–4 describes the five components 
and how they were updated for countries in the present study. 
 
Table A–4. Synopsis of update to Sachs-Warner  
Component Updating  method 
Black market premium > 20 
percent 
Global Development Network database for all years expect 
1994-95;  black market exchange rate for 1994-95 from ICA, 
various editions; CDI, various editions; official exchange 
rate from IMF 2002. Algeria, Haiti, Iran, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Syria rated closed through 1998. Ethiopia rated closed 1993–
96. Kenya and Uganda rated closed 1993–94. Zambia rated 
closed 1993 and 1998. 
Export marketing: “closed” if 
government has a purchasing 
monopoly on a major export 
crop and delinks purchase 
prices from international prices. 
Sub-Saharan Africa only. 
Based on late-1992 status from World Bank 1994, p. 239, 
and on late-1990’s IMF country reports. Absence of 
evidence in IMF documents of such intervention is 
interpreted as evidence of absence. Cameroon and Republic 
of Congo rated open 1993–98. Madagascar rated open 1997–
98. All other countries in present study unchanged since 
1992. 
Socialist  Based on CIA 2002. Republic of Congo rated non-socialist 
1991–97 but socialist in 1998. Ethiopia rated non-socialist 
1992–98. Nicaragua rated non-socialist for 1991–98. All 
other countries in study unchanged since 1992.  
Own-imported-weighted 
average frequency of non-tariff 
measures (licenses, 
prohibitions, and quotas) on 
capital goods and intermediates 
> 0.4 
Single estimates for late 1990’s derived from UNCTAD 
2001. Data year for imports: 1999. Data year for non-tariff 
measures: varies by country, between 1992 and 2000, mostly 
late-1990’s. Only Argentina, Bangladesh, China, and India 
rated closed. 
Own-imported-weighted 
average tariff on capital goods 
and intermediates > 0.4 
Single estimates for late 1990’s derived from UNCTAD 
2001. Only Pakistan rated closed. 
  18